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Abstract
Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. 
Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should (ideally at least) never be adversarial, 
as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adver-
sarial, given that adversariality (when suitably conceptualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the 
view that specific instances of argumentation are (and should be) adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What deter-
mines whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features 
and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved 
have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently 
associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start 
with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of 
the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed 
above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them.
Keywords Adversariality · Cooperation · Argumentation · Agonism · Consensus · Scientific norms
1 Introduction
Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argu-
mentation has been extensively discussed within different 
domains, including argumentation theory, feminist theory, 
critical thinking, deliberative democracy, and cognitive sci-
ence. Some authors criticize adversarial conceptions and 
practices of argumentation, instead defending more coop-
erative approaches on both moral and epistemic grounds. 
Others retort that what is problematic is not adversariality 
per se, but rather overly aggressive manifestations thereof.
Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions 
on this issue: argumentation should never be adversarial, 
as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative 
engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always 
adversarial, given that adversariality (when suitably con-
ceptualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. Dif-
ferent authors who have contributed to these debates fall 
within a spectrum between these two extreme positions, 
some closer to the ‘cooperative’ extremity and others closer 
to the ‘adversarial’ extremity. In what follows, I defend the 
view that specific instances of argumentation are (and should 
be) adversarial or cooperative to different degrees; this is a 
descriptive as well as a normative/prescriptive claim. This 
view seems to fall right in the middle of the spectrum. What 
determines whether an argumentative situation should be 
primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual 
features and background conditions external to the argumen-
tative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the 
parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent 
interests.
To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that 
are frequently associated with argumentation: the epis-
temic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict 
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management telos.1 (There may well be other presumed teloi 
for argumentation; this list is not intended to be exhaustive.) 
The epistemic telos consists in positing that the primary goal 
of argumentation is to promote epistemic improvement, 
understood as advancement of what we take to be valuable 
epistemic goals such as the attainment of knowledge and 
understanding, the maximization of true beliefs while mini-
mizing false beliefs, etc. The consensus-building telos posits 
that the primary goal of argumentation is to lead to consen-
sus whenever disagreement and dissent arises, in view of 
the need for social coordination in numerous circumstances. 
Finally, the conflict management telos highlights the role 
that argumentation can have in managing the inevitable 
conflicts that arise in any minimally complex human social 
setting. It is worth noting that I do not take any of these three 
teloi to be prima facie more fundamental than the others; 
one may be (as in fact I am) a pluralist about the goals of 
argumentation and maintain that argumentation may serve 
different purposes in different circumstances.2
In what follows, I discuss the extent to which (and under 
which circumstances) argumentation is indeed a suitable 
means to pursue these teloi by discussing different domains 
of human practices in which each of them seems to be appli-
cable and/or relevant. In particular, for each of them I dis-
cuss when cooperative or else adversarial argumentation is 
the appropriate response (to different degrees, not neces-
sarily as a binary opposition). This approach is intended to 
do justice to the multi-faceted nature of argumentation and 
to the insight that argumentative practices are embedded in 
complex social realities.
The paper proceeds as follows: I start with a brief dis-
cussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and 
conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates 
in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. 
Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above 
in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and coopera-
tion for each of them.
2  Adversariality, Cooperation, and Conflict
Let us start with some familiar but important observations. 
Humans are hyper-social animals; we need each other to 
survive. This means that there is pressure for humans to 
cooperate with conspecifics and care for each other. At the 
same time, as individuals we need to protect our interests 
and ensure access to essential resources for our survival; for 
this, we often need to compete with other humans. (Here 
there is a contrast with the social structure of other hyper-
social animals such as bees and termites, where individuals 
routinely sacrifice their own lives to promote the wellbe-
ing of the group as a whole.) Moreover, humans tend to 
create strong ties with specific groups, leading to intense 
within-group cooperation but competition with (and hostility 
toward) other groups and their individuals (in what is known 
as in-group/out-group dynamics (Ellemers and Haslam 
2012)). The upshot is that human sociality is characterized 
by strong levels of cooperation as well as strong levels of 
competition and adversariality. Most theorists would agree 
with this observation, but there is substantive disagreement 
as to which of these two tendencies prevails: some empha-
size the role of competition (e.g. Mercier and Sperber 2017), 
whereas others emphasize the role of cooperation in human 
sociality (e.g. Tomasello 2014). What is clear is that any 
explanation of human social behavior must take both phe-
nomena into account.
Competition and adversariality are closely related but 
different concepts. Prima facie, competition presupposes 
something that is competed for by different parties, whereas 
adversariality may come about even if there is no specific 
good or resource that different parties wish to acquire but 
cannot have simultaneously. (See for example Casey’s con-
ceptualization of adversariality in terms of involuntariness 
and attempts to control each other’s bodies and actions 
(Casey 2020).) For the present purposes, I adopt a concep-
tion of adversariality in terms of the interests that individu-
als or groups may have.3 Interests are states of affairs that 
individuals or groups wish to bring about; typically (though 
not necessarily), they will tend to contribute to the wellbe-
ing of the individual or group. Some examples: it is in my 
2 But see Goodwin (2007), who argues compellingly that approach-
ing argumentation in terms of function and telos raises a host of dif-
ficult issues.
3 Casey (2020) draws a distinction between adversariality pertaining 
to interests and adversariality as control, and then goes on to focus 
on the latter; here I focus on the former. However, this does not nec-
essarily mean that there is significant disagreement between us. For 
the purpose of philosophical theorizing, we have a certain amount 
of freedom in how to understand and define certain concepts; the 
main guiding principle is that of fruitfulness, in the spirit of Carna-
pian explication (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). My choice here is to focus 
on interests as a defining feature of adversariality so as to (hopefully) 
shed some new light on the issues under discussion, thus comple-
menting Casey’s analysis.
1 I follow Stevens and Cohen (2019) when using the telos termi-
nology. Notice that these teloi are understood as capturing the (pre-
sumed) structural functions of argumentation as a whole, not the 
personal motivations that individuals have to engage in argumenta-
tion (though these two can of course overlap to some extent). So for 
example, one might articulate the view that individuals join argumen-
tative encounters purely to win the argument and ‘score points’, but 
that as a whole argumentative practices still serve the overall function 
of improving the epistemic state of a community or of leading to con-
sensus.
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personal interest to enjoy a rich network of friendships; it 
is in the interest of a given minority group in a society that 
they not be discriminated against in the relevant job market.
Adversariality: An individual or group A and another 
individual or group B are adversaries if (a) A has an 
interest iA and B has an interest iB such that iA and iB 
cannot simultaneously obtain, or the more iA is satis-
fied, the less iB is satisfied (and vice-versa), and (b) 
both pursue their own interests.
Notice that the implication runs only in one direction, as 
there might be other ways for A and B to be adversaries 
other than by having clashing interests. A special case of 
adversariality thus understood is when A and B are compet-
ing for some specific rivalrous good or resource which is 
scarce, such that A having more of it entails B having less 
of it (and vice-versa). But a formulation of the notion of 
adversariality in terms of interests provides a more general 
perspective that can also account for situations of adversari-
ality where there is no obvious resource under dispute, but 
rather the obtainment of conflicting states of affairs.
Moreover, it is important to note that adversariality is 
distinct from egoism. On the one hand, it may be that A and 
B are not adversaries even though they only care about their 
own interests (and are thus egoists). This would happen if 
the promotion of A’s interests does not threaten the promo-
tion of B’s interests. On the other hand, A and B may care 
about the wellbeing of others (Van Lange 1999) and yet still 
be adversaries (even if this might be a somewhat unusual 
situation). For example, Zollman (2020) shows that people 
can face difficult game-theoretic problems that effectively 
make them adversaries to others even if they altruistically 
pursue purely epistemic goals.
Furthermore, notice that the relation of adversariality 
between A and B obtains relative to a pair of interests iA 
and iB. At least in principle, it is possible for A and B to be 
adversaries relative to iA and iB, but allies relative to some 
other common interest (though the idea of ‘adversariality 
spillover’ seems plausible). But if there is a clash of interests 
thus described, then when A works towards promoting and 
enforcing iA, this will entail actions and interventions that 
will prevent iB from coming about (partially or completely), 
thus obstructing B from obtaining the interests they pursue. 
Crucially, the relation of adversariality between A and B 
relies on actively pursued interests, not their idle interests, 
as specified by clause (b) in the definition above.
Cooperation between A and B, by contrast, may come 
about in different ways, such as4:
• Egoistic cooperation (E-cooperation): iA and iB are suffi-
ciently aligned so that A and B can cooperate while at the 
same time still primarily pursuing their own individual 
interests.
• Joint cooperation (J-cooperation): A and B pursue a 
common interest which is best (or only) achieved by 
means of joint action. One might then say that A and B 
in fact form a new unit C and pursue iC together.5
• Altruistic cooperation (A-cooperation): A and B have 
conflicting interests iA and iB, but A does not pursue these 
interests actively, thus leaving room for B’s interests to 
thrive. Instead, A actively promotes iB, despite it not 
being for her own individual benefit.6
In what follows, these conceptualizations will provide the 
theoretical background for an analysis of adversariality and 
cooperation specifically with respect to argumentation.
Before moving on to argumentation specifically, let me 
be explicit about a particular assumption I will be relying 
on: conflict is an inevitable and ineliminable component of 
human lives. Notice that the term ‘conflict’ is used here to 
refer to the quasi-ontological background of clashes of inter-
ests, whereas ‘adversariality’ is reserved for the actualization 
of conflict when different individuals or groups effectively 
pursue their conflicting interests. Here I follow authors 
such as Nietzsche (see Pearson 2018), Foucault (2003), and 
more recently Mouffe (2000) and Medina (2011) who hold 
a ‘tragic’ (in the ancient Greek sense) view of the human 
condition (Wenman 2013), and who have theorized about 
conflict and its political as well as epistemic implications. 
For these authors, conflict cannot be eliminated, but it can 
be channeled. Channeling and managing conflict is essen-
tial because conflict alone does not define human sociality; 
cooperation is just as central (Tomasello 2014). But given 
that different individuals and different groups will inevitably 
have interests that clash with those of others and will each 
pursue these conflicting interests to various degrees (at least 
4 This list is not intended to be exhaustive.
5 See the plural subject theory in Gilbert (1990) and the team reason-
ing account of cooperation in Gold and Sugden (2007).
6 For example, a feminist man may work toward promoting the inter-
ests of women in his society even if this may mean he will personally 
lose some of the male privileges he enjoyed so far. (Such people are 
described in activist circles as ‘allies’.) Notice that here cooperation 
will typically (though not necessarily) be asymmetric: A cooperates 
with B, but not the other way round. A-cooperation will not fea-
ture prominently in what follows, as it is not immediately clear how 
instances of A-cooperation can be relevant specifically for argumen-
tative practices. But one might think of learning contexts, where A 
engages in argumentation with B so as to increase B’s understanding 
of a given topic, even if this entails an expenditure of time and energy 
for A that may have no immediate concrete pay-off for her (other than 
the satisfaction of helping B).
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this seems like a reasonable enough assumption), conflict 
seems to be a given in human sociality.
3  Critiques and Defenses of Adversariality 
in Argumentation
Let us now turn specifically to argumentation. In recent dec-
ades, much has been written on adversariality in argumenta-
tion. In particular, a number of authors have argued against 
conceptualizations of argumentation (in philosophy as else-
where) as inherently adversarial (Moulton 1983; Gilbert 
1994; Cohen 1995; Rooney 2012; Hundleby 2013; Bailin 
and Battersby 2017). Many (but not all) of these authors for-
mulated their criticism specifically from a feminist perspec-
tive. In turn, others have argued that adversariality, when 
suitably understood, can be seen as an integral and in fact 
desirable component of argumentation (Govier 1999; Aikin 
2011; Casey 2020).7
Feminist critiques of adversariality challenge conceptions 
of argumentation as a form of competition, where mascu-
line-coded values of aggression and violence prevail (Kidd 
2020). For these authors, such conceptions encourage argu-
mentative performances where excessive use of forcefulness 
is on display. These instances of aggressive argumentation 
in turn will have a number of problematic consequences: 
epistemic consequences—the pursuit of truth is not best 
served by adversarial argumentation—as well as moral/
ethical/political consequences—these practices exclude 
a number of people from participating in argumentative 
encounters, namely those for whom displays of aggression 
do not constitute socially acceptable behavior (women and 
other socially disadvantaged groups in particular). These 
authors defend alternative conceptions of argumentation as 
a cooperative, nurturing activity (Gilbert 1994; Bailin and 
Battersby 2017), which are traditionally feminine-coded val-
ues. Crucially, they view adversarial conceptions of argu-
mentation as optional, maintaining that the alternatives are 
equally legitimate and that cooperative conceptions should 
be adopted and practiced.
But what appears to be implicit in many (though not all 
of) these feminist analyses is a general rejection of conflict as 
such; emphasis on argumentation as a cooperative endeavor 
suggests that participants will straightforwardly have com-
mon interests, or else that conflict can be overcome through 
argumentation. More generally, the implication seems to be 
(though I am not aware of it being explicitly stated) that 
conflict as such, coded as masculine and with negative 
valence, is optional: it is bad, and it should be eliminated. 
In a post-patriarchal, utopian world, human sociality would 
be defined entirely by cooperative bonds. A weaker version 
of this position might be that conflict itself is not optional, 
but enacting conflict in argumentation is optional, and thus 
non-adversarial argumentation should be pursued.
These criticisms of adversarial argumentation have in 
turn been challenged in various ways. One overall theme is 
the need to draw a distinction between (excessive) aggres-
siveness and adversariality as such. Govier, for example, 
distinguishes between ancillary (negative) adversariality 
and minimal adversariality (Govier 1999). The thought is 
that, while the feminist critique of excessive aggression in 
argumentation is well taken, adversariality conceived and 
practiced in different ways need not have the detrimental 
consequences of more extreme versions of belligerent argu-
mentation. More recently, Govier helpfully distinguishes 
between opposition to a claim and opposition to a person 
(Govier 2020). Moreover, for these authors, adversariality in 
argumentation is simply not optional: it is an intrinsic feature 
of argumentative practices. (But notice that Govier, Aikin 
and Casey each develop different accounts of adversariality 
in argumentation.)
From the conception of adversariality in terms of conflict-
ing interests sketched in the previous section, it does not fol-
low that argumentation is intrinsically adversarial.8 Indeed, 
imagine two arguers whose interests are sufficiently aligned 
(E-cooperation), or who share a common goal (J-coopera-
tion); they may then engage in an exchange of reasons for 
the sake of pursuing these common interests (Norman 2016; 
Tomasello 2014). In such cases, there does not seem to be 
any obvious way in which the argumentative interaction will 
necessarily be adversarial, even if the arguers initially hold 
different opinions, and even if at the end of the interaction 
they still have not converged into a common view. Thus, 
adopting the perspective of adversariality as arising from 
conflicting interests, it seems perfectly possible for some 
argumentative encounters not to be adversarial at all, as 
claimed by the critics of adversariality. I also agree with 
them that, whenever possible and suitable, these kinds of 
cooperative argumentative encounters should be encouraged 
and promoted (for example in the context of education (Bai-
lin and Battersby 2017)). Thus viewed, argumentation may 
become a joint action (J-cooperation) where the contribution 
of all parties is essential for the pursuit of the common inter-
est in question—like pair dancing, duet singing, or pushing 
a car (on joint action, see Schweikard and Schmid 2013). In 
8 It may well be that, if adversariality is conceptualized differently, 
argumentation will still come out as intrinsically adversarial. So I am 
not contesting the intrinsicality claim in general, but only with respect 
to this particular conceptualization of adversariality in terms of con-
flicting interests.
7 To be sure, there are important differences between the authors in 
each of these two groups, which for reasons of space cannot be prop-
erly addressed.
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fact, the Lakatosian ‘proofs and refutations’ model of the 
production of mathematical knowledge (Lakatos 1976) is 
a quintessential example of argumentation as joint action, 
requiring the contribution of multiple parties to come about 
(as I argued in Dutilh Novaes (2020c), Chapter 11).9
However, I reject the (tacit) implication (or assumption) 
that conflict and adversariality in argumentation can (and 
should) be entirely eliminated. Even if there is a background 
of substantive interdependence and cooperation among 
humans, there will still be clashing interests that give rise to 
conflict and (insofar as actors pursue their respective inter-
ests at the expense of the interests of others) adversarial-
ity. In these situations, it may be perfectly appropriate for 
argumentation to be adversarial, for example in matters of 
social justice and political contestation. (More on this in 
Sect. 6; Aikin (2011) makes similar points.) In such cases, 
it is not argumentation that causes and gives rise to adver-
sariality; adversariality already exists prior to the argumen-
tative encounter, and argumentation may be one component 
of various strategies to manage (and potentially mitigate) 
adversariality and conflict. (Which is not to say that argu-
mentation will always or even typically be the most adequate 
instrument to manage adversariality and conflict; more on 
this in Sect. 6.) Attempts to eliminate adversariality and 
manifestations thereof from argumentative encounters when 
there is already a background of conflict are not only futile, 
but also potentially dangerous: the conflict in question will 
be made invisible and left unacknowledged. What should 
be aimed at instead is what Aikin describes as proportional 
adversariality (see Appendix 1 for a simple model of how 
to measure the degree of adversariality between two agents).
The key is the maintenance of proportionality in 
exchange. Argumentative exchanges escalate some-
times justly and sometimes unjustly. It is necessary 
that we have at hand a variety of skills and techniques 
that mitigate harmful escalation. (Aikin 2011, p. 269)
In the next sections, I examine a number of situations where 
argumentative encounters occur, considering three of the 
presumed teloi of argumentation discussed in the literature. 
For each of them I discuss when cooperative or adversarial 
argumentation may be the appropriate response. Importantly, 
the cooperative vs. adversarial opposition is understood here 
as a matter of degrees rather than as a sharp distinction, 
hence the notion of proportional adversariality: the argu-
mentative encounter may be adversarial to the extent that it 
reflects pre-existing levels of adversariality (and potentially 
other contextual factors as well). This means that a given 
argumentative situation may be overly adversarial, exacer-
bating or even creating conflict.10 But it may also be insuf-
ficiently adversarial, which may occur for example when 
the more powerful side of an interaction is in a position 
to suppress the justified objections and complaints by the 
less powerful (with devices such as ‘tone policing’ (Cherry 
2018)), or when the less powerful do not feel sufficiently safe 
to speak up (Dotson 2014).
4  Epistemic Telos
We speak of argumentation as having an epistemic telos 
when we take its primary purpose to be that of improving 
our doxastic position by increasing knowledge and under-
standing, and by helping us to maximize true beliefs and 
minimize false beliefs (as these can reasonably be taken to 
be our main epistemic aims). When critically examining rea-
sons for and against a given position, we would be able to 
weed out the weaker, poorly justified beliefs (more likely to 
be false) and end up with stronger, suitably justified beliefs 
(more likely to be true). It is in this sense that argumentation 
is thought to be truth-conducive, at least in cases where there 
is an objectively correct answer to a problem.11 Goldman 
captures this idea in the following terms:
Norms of good argumentation are substantially dedi-
cated to the promotion of truthful speech and the expo-
sure of falsehood, whether intentional or unintentional. 
[…] Norms of good argumentation are part of a prac-
tice to encourage the exchange of truths through sin-
cere, non-negligent, and mutually corrective speech. 
(Goldman 1994, p. 30)
In this vein, a number of authors, most notably John Stuart 
Mill (and more recently Betz 2013; Mercier and Sperber 
2017), maintain that interpersonal argumentative situations, 
involving people who truly disagree with each other, work 
9 However, one may retort that, while two agents may collaborate to 
construct an argument together, the argument in turn may be intended 
for another agent off scene, a non-present adversary. (I owe this point 
to Scott Aikin.)
10 This observation reflects the recognition that argumentation by 
itself can become a catalyst for adversariality and hostility. As noted 
by Aikin (2011, p. 286), an argumentative interaction has a number of 
structural features that make it prone to escalation, such as its poten-
tial to cause irritation and its departure from default conversational 
norms of credulity. See also Dutilh Novaes (2020b) on the irritation 
and unpleasantness that can be caused by argumentation.
11 It is known from the literature on group problem-solving (sur-
veyed in Laughlin 2011) that, for intellective problems, that is, those 
that have a unique answer within a given theoretical framework (e.g. 
a mathematical or logical problem), group discussion has a clear ben-
eficial, truth-conducive effect. But for so-called judgmental problems, 
that is problems for which there is no unique solution and judgments 
of values are involved, the evidence is less clear.
 C. Dutilh Novaes 
1 3
best to realize the epistemic potential of argumentation. Mill 
famously defended this position in On Liberty (1859), posit-
ing that when our ideas are challenged by engagement with 
those who disagree with us, we are forced to consider our 
own beliefs more thoroughly and critically.
[Man] is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discus-
sion and experience. Not by experience alone. There 
must be discussion, to show how experience is to be 
interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually 
yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to 
produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before 
it. (Mill 1999, p. 41)
The expected result is that the remaining beliefs, those that 
have survived critical challenges, will be better grounded 
than those held before such encounters. As Mill puts it, 
“both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon 
as there is no enemy in the field.”12 (Mill 1999, p. 83). Dis-
senters thus force us to stay epistemically alert instead of 
becoming too comfortable with existing, entrenched beliefs. 
The presupposition seems to be, however, that even when 
disagreeing with each other, arguers involved in these 
encounters share a common goal, namely epistemic improve-
ment, and that this common goal should overrule other ten-
dencies such as seeking to ‘score points’ with an audience 
(‘arguing to win’ (Fisher and Keil 2016)). How realistic is 
this presupposition in real-life situations?
There is at least one domain of organized human activity 
where the epistemic telos of argumentation is presumed to 
prevail, namely scientific investigation. But even science is 
ultimately also a ‘human, all too human’ activity where fac-
tors such as competition and vanity also play a role. Indeed, 
let us start by acknowledging that, while ideally engaged in 
the common goal of advancing human knowledge, scientists 
also compete for scarce resources such as money to fund 
their research, visibility, reputation, jobs etc. In this sense, 
scientists can be viewed as adversaries of one another (in 
terms of the pursuit of conflicting interests). These com-
petitive interactions can occur at group level (e.g. different 
groups working on cracking a particular scientific puzzle and 
competing to be the first one, given the significance of sci-
entific priority (Strevens 2003)), or at individual level (e.g. 
different scientists competing for a given job). If scientists 
are understood as adversaries in this sense, it is not unrea-
sonable to expect their argumentative practices to reflect this 
fact, such as being uncharitable when discussing opposing 
views, attacking straw-men, working on undermining the 
visibility of competing theories etc. As a descriptive claim, 
it is undeniable that scientists sometimes (often?) engage 
in overly adversarial argumentation, as attested by the long 
history of ugly scientific feuds (Levy 2010). The question 
remains whether it is desirable for adversariality to manifest 
itself in scientific practice and scientific argumentation in 
this way.
It might be thought that, even if individual scientists 
are exclusively (or predominantly) engaged in promoting 
their own interests rather than pursuing the goal of advanc-
ing human knowledge, as a whole the structure of scien-
tific investigation still ensures that this epistemic goal is 
achieved. This would be the case precisely thanks to the 
fierce competition among scientists, which would ensure 
that only the strongest theories and ideas survive: indi-
vidual vices would lead to a collectively virtuous system, a 
phenomenon known as ‘Mandevillian intelligence’ (Smart 
2018).13 But it might also be that vices at the individual level 
(including practices such as scientific fraud, unfair compe-
tition, etc.) also end up corrupting science as a collective 
epistemic enterprise. If this is so, then there may be good 
reasons to manage and contain adversariality in scientific 
practice and argumentation.
Indeed, it may be argued that some of the very pillars of 
scientific practice and methods are intended to ensure that 
the epistemic telos be primarily pursued rather than the indi-
vidual, non-epistemic interests of scientists (such as securing 
jobs, becoming famous etc.). The pioneer sociologist of sci-
ence R. Merton famously described four sets of institutional 
imperatives (now known as ‘Mertonian norms’) that would 
comprise the ‘ethos’ of modern science (Merton 1942):
• Communalism: all scientists should have common own-
ership of scientific resources so as to promote collective 
collaboration.14
• Universalism: scientific validity is independent of the 
sociopolitical status or personal attributes of individual 
scientists.
• Disinterestedness: scientific institutions act for the ben-
efit of a common scientific enterprise, rather than for the 
personal gain of individuals within the scientific com-
munity.
• Organized skepticism: scientific claims should be 
exposed to critical scrutiny by peers before being 
accepted.
14 Merton’s communalism is closely related to the ‘principle of pub-
licity’ (Piccinini 2003).
12 Notice here an instance of the familiar ‘argument-as-war’ meta-
phor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Cohen 1995).
13 “I’ve heard the pragma-dialecticians say just this: the more hostile 
arguers are—the more they want to defeat each other—the more they 
are motivated to produce high quality arguments, and thus the more 
functional their joint activity becomes.” (Goodwin 2007, p. 79).
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These principles are presented as ideals that the scien-
tific community as a whole should aspire to rather than as 
descriptive claims about actual scientific practice; Merton 
understood them to embody what most practicing scientists 
take to be the ethos of modern science.15 There has been 
much criticism of the Mertonian norms as a descriptive 
model and even as a normative model of scientific practice 
(Kim and Kim 2018). (The extent to which practicing sci-
entists de facto adhere to them (both reflectively and in their 
practices) is itself an interesting empirical question.) But 
they can plausibly be seen as reasonable regulative princi-
ples: when followed, they should promote the epistemic telos 
of science and discourage the pursuit of non-epistemic indi-
vidual interests. They offer a counterbalance to the fact that 
scientists are ultimately simply humans moved by their per-
sonal interests (as recognized by Merton himself (Kim and 
Kim 2018)). If scientific inquiry is still to be predominantly 
an epistemic enterprise, provisions must be in place to con-
tain and suitably channel the pursuit of non-epistemic inter-
ests. Ideally, these principles should be enforced by means 
of institutional factors (including the education and training 
of future scientists) and with a suitable reward system.16
These principles also have interesting implications for 
argumentative practices in science, given that scientists also 
essentially engage in practices of ‘giving and asking for rea-
sons’, seeking to persuade their peers of the cogency of their 
claims (Zamora Bonilla 2006). Communalism should ensure 
that the informational background of a scientific community 
is transparent, thus  establishing sufficient common ground 
in these debates. Universalism entails the idea that what 
matters in science is the quality of the argument as such, 
not the reputation or standing of the scientist proposing it 
(although, as we know, this is far from descriptively accu-
rate: epistemic injustices of various sorts routinely occur in 
science (Grasswick 2017)). Disinterestedness should ensure 
that, when engaging in a scientific debate, a scientist argues 
‘to learn’ rather than ‘to win’ (Fisher and Keil 2016).
Finally, the principle of organized skepticism should have 
the effect of institutionalizing critical scrutiny so that sci-
entific objections are not perceived as personal attacks (as 
is typically the case in more mundane dialogical interac-
tions, which follow default norms of credulity (Aikin 2011, 
p. 268)). It is the job of a scientist to critically assess the 
arguments put forward by her peers, that is, to avoid being 
easily convinced. In this way, the scientist is in fact collabo-
rating with peers when engaging critically, as objections and 
comments will help them improve their scientific theories. 
I describe in detail this form of ‘critical collaboration’ in 
mathematics  in terms of a dialogue between two charac-
ters, Prover and Skeptic (thus echoing Mertonian organized 
skepticism) (Dutilh Novaes 2020c, Chapter 11), but the idea 
applies to scientific inquiry more generally.17
Organized skepticism thus understood does not in fact 
qualify as a form of adversariality in the sense adopted here: 
ideally, a scientist who is submitting the work of a colleague 
to critical scrutiny is pursuing the same interest as her col-
league, namely to advance human knowledge.18 From this 
perspective, a scientist whose work is being criticized by a 
peer may be able to assuage the natural, instinctive reaction 
to become defensive when being criticized. Instead, she may, 
as Socrates, even come to prefer being refuted rather than 
to refute (Dutilh Novaes 2020b). The fact that, in practice, 
scientists will not always abide by this principle indicates 
that cultivating the argumentative virtue of being open to 
constructive criticism remains a challenge, also for scien-
tists. Moreover, the reward system and institutions in sci-
ence are far from perfect, sometimes encouraging practices 
of ‘scoring points’ in argumentation rather than the joint 
pursuit of knowledge. But at both levels (personal practices 
and institutions), offering and being open to constructive 
criticism remains a valuable ideal to aspire to.
Thus understood, it is natural to expect that there should 
be a fair amount of J-cooperation in science, that is, coopera-
tion as joint action. The common goal of advancing human 
knowledge is arguably best pursued by collective and coordi-
nated efforts by the scientific community as a whole; Charles 
Sanders Peirce was a famous proponent of this model of 
scientific practice (Nubiola 2014). (E-cooperation probably 15 An important caveat here is that much of what is now done under 
the heading of ‘scientific research’ is aimed at specific applications 
funded by interested parties, e.g. the pharmaceutical industry. The 
Mertonian norms would thus apply primarily to what is often referred 
to as basic, foundational research, not to industrial research. Since the 
1990s, there has been increasing commercialisation of academic sci-
ence, which is clearly in tension with the classical Mertonian norms 
(especially communalism and disinterestedness) (Kim and Kim 
2018).
16 Unfortunately, it is far from obvious that the current reward sys-
tem in science is suitable in this way. For example, Bright (2017) has 
argued for the surprising conclusion that pursuing the epistemic, veri-
tistic telos in science may in fact encourage vicious behavior such as 
fraud. “It turns out that a sincere desire on the part of scientists to see 
the truth propagated may well promote more fraud rather than less.” 
(p. 291).
17 See Stevens and Cohen (2020) for an articulation of the view that 
critical engagement—playing ‘Devil’s advocate’—can significantly 
contribute to argumentation’s goals.
18 Similarly, the protocol of ‘adversarial collaboration’ for empirical 
research, which consists in two researchers/groups who have opposite 
views on a given scientific open question or controversy teaming up 
to investigate their topic of disagreement (Mellers et al. 2001; Matzke 
et al. 2015), does not count as adversarial in the sense countenanced 
here. The scientists have different views, but they (presumably) share 
the common goal of advancing human knowledge. What this protocol 
shows is the epistemic value of dissent, provided that there be suffi-
cient alignment of interests and goals.
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also has its place in science.) Admittedly, I have not cat-
egorically refuted the ‘Mandevillian intelligence’ account 
of scientific practice, but I take it to be much less plausible 
(both descriptively and prescriptively) than a joint action 
model, where scientists primarily and jointly pursue a com-
mon epistemic telos (but of course against a background 
of various forms of non-epistemic adversariality). Coopera-
tive argumentation, including constructive criticism, is a key 
component of this model.
To conclude, in this section the epistemic telos of argu-
mentation was discussed with a focus on scientific inquiry, 
which is arguably the organized human activity where this 
epistemic telos is most salient (for argumentation as well as 
more generally). The general points should apply to other 
domains where people share the common (primary) goal of 
advancing human knowledge as such (e.g. educational set-
tings). The main point is that when such a convergence of 
interests occurs toward epistemic progress, it seems advis-
able to moderate and manage adversariality relative to other 
goals and interests, including in argumentative practices. 
Ideals of scientific integrity and respectful critical engage-
ment can play the role of mitigating the interference of back-
ground non-epistemic conflicts of interests.
This being said, disagreement and dissent—which are 
here treated as distinct from adversariality, even so-called 
‘minimal adversariality’19—can have a beneficial epistemic 
role insofar as they promote critical scrutiny. This point is 
aptly captured by the Mertonian norm of ‘organized skep-
ticism’. Naturally, critical engagement can be weaponized 
and used in excessive forms (in philosophy in particular, as 
argued in Moulton (1983) and Rooney (2012)); but exclud-
ing criticism and dissent completely from science and intel-
lectual inquiry in general is not desirable, hence the impor-
tance of ‘organized skepticism’. Instead, good scientific 
practices should ensure that criticism remains constructive, 
thus countering excessive adversarial tendencies that are not 
conducive to the epistemic telos of science.
5  Consensus‑Building Telos
Another important strand in the literature are theories that 
take consensus to be the fundamental telos of an argu-
mentative process: to eliminate or resolve a difference of 
(expressed) opinion. The influential tradition of pragma-dia-
lectic is one of the main exponents of this view: “argumen-
tation has the general function of managing the resolution 
of disagreement.” (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1996, 
p. 278). Gilbert’s concept of coalescent argumentation is 
another approach that takes consensus to be the telos of 
argumentation (Gilbert 1997).
What seems to motivate these consensus-oriented 
approaches is the attribution of a role of social coordina-
tion to argumentation. Because humans are social animals 
and must often cooperate with other humans to success-
fully accomplish certain tasks, they must have mechanisms 
to align their beliefs and intentions, and subsequently their 
actions (Tomasello 2014). The thought is that argumentation 
would be a particularly suitable mechanism for such align-
ment, as an exchange of reasons would make it more likely 
that differences of opinion would decrease (Norman 2016). 
This may happen insofar as argumentation is indeed a good 
way to track truths and avoid falsehoods: by being involved 
in the same epistemic process of exchanging reasons, the 
participants in an argumentative situation can presumably 
converge towards the truth, and thus the upshot would be 
that they also come to agree with each other.20 However, 
consensus-oriented views need not presuppose that argu-
mentation is truth-conducive: the ultimate goal of argumen-
tation on these views is that of social coordination, and for 
this, tracking the truth is not a requirement per se, as long as 
beliefs, intentions and actions are aligned. This means that 
argumentation can lead to consensus also in matters where 
there isn’t necessarily one ‘truth’ to converge towards.
Indeed, the social complexity of human life is ultimately 
what motivates the emphasis on consensus. There are many 
important situations where some degree of consensus and 
coordination is necessarily, especially regarding politi-
cal decisions. In particular, the very notion of deliberative 
democracy is viewed as resting crucially on argumentative 
practices (Landemore 2012; Fishkin 2016; Habermas 1996). 
(For the present purposes, ‘deliberation’ and ‘argumenta-
tion’ can be treated roughly as synonymous). Habermas, for 
example, defends the idea of the ‘public sphere’ as the space 
where deliberation aiming at a rational consensus takes place 
(Olson 2014). Political deliberation should allow for the col-
lective organization of people’s lives, including the common 
rules we should live by. In a deliberative democracy, for a 
decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic 
public deliberation, not merely the aggregation of prefer-
ences that occurs in voting. When full consensus does not 
emerge, the different people involved may opt for a compro-
mise solution. This is what usually happens in, for example, 
19 This is the main reason why, in my work on deductive arguments, 
I moved away from the ‘proponent-opponent’ terminology, which 
suggests adversariality, towards the ‘Prover-Skeptic’ terminology 
(Dutilh Novaes 2020c).
20 Again, what the literature on group decision-making suggests is 
that argumentation and deliberation is truth-conducive in particular 
for intellective problems (Laughlin 2011), and assuming common 
goals/interests. The same does not seem to be straightforwardly the 
case in other situations (judgmental problems and/or conflict of inter-
ests).
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coalition-based political systems, where after an election 
typically a number of different parties must come together 
in a coalition to compose a majority government.
But how effective is argumentation when it comes to 
building consensus? The well-documented phenomenon 
of polarization (Isenberg 1986; Sunstein 2002) seems to 
suggest that argumentation is in fact not always a suitable 
means to reach consensus. Work on formal modeling of 
multi-agent argumentative encounters (Olsson 2013) offers 
further evidence suggesting that, when there is a certain 
amount of disagreement at the starting point and agents are 
given the opportunity to deliberate, they end up even further 
apart from each other in their opinions after engaging in 
argumentation.
Instead, it seems that it is only under quite specific cir-
cumstances that argumentation may lead to consensus, as 
also shown by the multi-agent simulations studied in Betz 
(2013). It is especially in situations of cooperation and align-
ment of interests that argumentation is likely to lead to con-
sensus and to better solutions—in other words, situations of 
collaborative decision-making. Tomasello (2014) argues that 
exchanging reasons is a powerful tool in such situations; if 
the joint decision is to benefit all parties, then individuals 
want to make the best decision based on sound reasons and 
evidence (regardless of who ‘wins’ the argument), so they 
produce and evaluate reasons cooperatively as a means to 
that end. Tomasello and colleagues conducted a number of 
experiments that confirmed the efficacy of argumentation 
in cooperative settings, also showing that competitive set-
tings may lead to suboptimal argumentative exchanges (with 
children at least) (Domberg et al. 2018).
By contrast, argumentation does not seem to be a par-
ticularly suitable means to reach consensus in situations of 
conflicts of interests, especially when the different parties 
pursue their clashing interests—in other words, when they 
are adversaries of each other, in the sense adopted here. 
Instead, what is more likely to ensue in such cases is polari-
zation and further escalation of conflict (unless de-escalation 
measures are in place (Aikin 2011; Talisse 2019)).21
What is even more worrisome is that a focus on consen-
sus may in fact end up reinforcing and perpetuating existing 
unequal power relations in a society. “In an unjust society, 
what purports to be a cooperative exchange of reasons really 
perpetuates patterns of oppression.” (Goodwin 2007, p. 77). 
Goodwin further argues that consensus-oriented accounts of 
argumentation, e.g. pragma-dialectic, seem to naively pre-
suppose a homogeneous, harmonious society where deep 
conflicts of interests are not salient, and where (superficial) 
differences of opinion can be resolved in a ‘gentlemanly’ 
way through reasonable argumentation. This general point 
has been made eloquently by a number of feminist political 
thinkers (e.g. Young 2000), who have highlighted the exclu-
sionary implications of consensus-oriented political deliber-
ation à la Habermas (among others).22 The more ‘civilized’ 
and non-adversarial these discussions are expected to be, the 
more exclusionary they will be regarding those who have 
good reasons to be angry, and those whose communicative 
strategies do not fit the mold of what is considered reason-
able, ‘polite’ discourse (Henning 2018).
In fact, the focus on consensus may be seen as an attempt 
to sweep the problem of conflict under the rug as it were, 
which, instead of solving it, is more likely to exacerbate 
it. This is a point often made by the theorists of agonistic 
democracy, who will be discussed in the next section. The 
gist of their criticism can be thus summarized:
Where liberals and deliberative democrats typically 
seek to overcome or transcend conflict by bringing it 
under a set of regulative principles (foundational prin-
ciples of justice or context-transcending principles of 
communicative rationality), the agonists insist that 
these responses actually serve to exacerbate the prob-
lem. Instead, we should look to sublimate this hostility 
by transforming it into more constructive modes of 
rivalry. (Wenman 2013, p. xiii)
In other words, conflict in a society cannot be made to dis-
appear by simply ‘wishing it away’, that is, by postulating 
that consensus can always (or even typically) be achieved. 
Reasonable or rational argumentation will not by itself, con-
trary to what many seem to think, reliably lead to the resolu-
tion of disagreements, in particular when the interests of the 
different parties are not aligned, or when they do not share 
fundamental values.23 (We will return to these points in the 
next section.)
In sum, consensus-oriented argumentation seems par-
ticularly suitable in cooperative settings, especially in cases 
of J-cooperation, where the joint decision is to benefit all 
involved parties. In adversarial settings however, not only is 
argumentation not likely to resolve (in the sense of giving 
21 One example of Aikin’s de-escalation measures is to ensure that 
argumentative encounters can begin with and be moderated by the 
gestures of personal connection. See also Young’s communicative 
actions to mitigate exclusion from debates discussed in the next sec-
tion.
22 See also Geuss (2019) on the limitations of the Habermasian 
framework in real-life political situations.
23 Isaiah Berlin’s notion of value pluralism is relevant here: “In Ber-
lin’s terms, competing values are often (but not always) ‘incommen-
surable’ and ‘there might exist no single universal overarching stand-
ard that would enable a man to choose rationally between’ them.” 
(Wenman 2013, p. 30). That is, disagreement about these values 
cannot be resolved by means of rational argumentation. These would 
be instances of what is now known as deep disagreements (Fogelin 
1985).
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rise to consensus) disagreements that stem from deeper con-
flicts of interests. Under the naïve assumption of a shared 
interest—to reach consensus—consensus-oriented argumen-
tation may in fact end up reinforcing patterns of oppression. 
This does not mean, however, that argumentation has no 
place in situations of (political) adversariality; we will see 
in the next section that argumentation can be an instrument 
to manage (instead of resolving) conflict and disagreement.
6  Conflict Management Telos
So let us now turn to the conflict management telos of argu-
mentation. In a sense, the consensus-building telos as pre-
viously discussed is a special case of conflict management, 
based on the assumption that the best way to manage conflict 
and disagreement is to aim for consensus. But conflict can be 
managed in different ways, not all of them leading to consen-
sus; indeed, some authors maintain that argumentation may 
help mitigate conflict even when the explicit aim is not that 
of reaching consensus (as we will see).24 To this category 
also belong the conceptualizations of argumentation-as-war 
discussed (and criticized) by a number of authors (Cohen 
1995; Bailin and Battersby 2017); in such cases, conflict 
is not so much managed but rather enacted (and possibly 
exacerbated). Thus seen, the telos of argumentation would 
not be fundamentally different from the telos of other organ-
ized competitive activities such as sports or even war (with 
suitable rules of engagement) (Aikin 2011).
Importantly, authors who identify conflict management 
(or variations thereof) as the telos of argumentation differ 
in their overall appreciation of the value of argumentation: 
some take it to be at best futile and at worst destructive,25 
while others attribute a more positive role to argumentation 
in conflict management. In what follows, we focus on these 
more optimistic accounts, in particular on the concept of 
agonism as developed by Chantal Mouffe.
Let us start with the observation that, when conflict with 
others emerges, people have a variety of options on how to 
manage the situation: they may choose not to engage and flee 
instead (maybe because the reason for conflict is not worth 
the risks involved); they may go into full-blown fighting 
mode, which may include physical aggression; or they may 
opt for approaches somewhere in between the fight-or-flight 
extremes of the spectrum. Argumentation would belong to 
this intermediary category, as described by Aikin:
[A]rgument literally is a form of pacifism—we are 
using words instead of swords to settle our disputes. 
With argument, we settle our disputes in ways that are 
most respectful of those who disagree—we do not buy 
them off, we do not threaten them, and we do not beat 
them into submission. Instead, we give them reasons 
that bear on the truth or falsity of their beliefs. How-
ever adversarial argument may be, it isn’t bombing. 
[…] argument is a pacifistic replacement for truly vio-
lent solutions to disagreements… (Aikin 2011, p. 256)
This is not to say that argumentation will always or even typ-
ically be the best approach to handle conflict and disagree-
ment; the point is rather that argumentation at least has the 
potential to do so, provided that the background conditions 
are suitable and that provisions to mitigate escalation are in 
place (Aikin 2011). Versions of this view can be found in the 
work of agonistic authors, in particular (but not exclusively) 
Chantal Mouffe, for whom democratic practices, including 
argumentation/deliberation, have the function to contain 
hostility and transform it into more constructive forms of 
contest (while also recognizing the inevitability of conflict). 
In the same vein, Mouffe offers compelling criticism of con-
sensus-oriented theories of deliberative democracy such as 
those of Habermas and Rawls (Mouffe 1999).
While theories of agonistic democracy differ substantially 
from each other (Wenman 2013), they all seem committed 
to three basic tenets:
(i) an emphasis on constitutive pluralism, (ii) a tragic 
vision of a world without hope of final redemption 
from conflict, suffering, and strife, and (iii) a belief 
that certain forms of contest can be a political good. 
(Wenman 2013, p. 18)
The agonist thus posits that pluralism is at the heart of the 
human experience, which is constituted by a plurality of 
perspectives, views, ways of life, values etc. Pluralism is 
not just the starting point to be overcome by means of (argu-
mentative or otherwise) consensus-forming procedures; 
instead, it is an ineliminable and in fact desirable feature of 
social realities, in particular given our aspirations towards 
freedom. But where there is pluralism, there is conflict, as 
these different ways of life will typically not be content with 
simply coexisting side by side. In particular, on many occa-
sions individuals and groups will become adversaries of 
each other in the sense that they pursue clashing interests, 
hence the tragedy of perennial conflict and strife. However, 
24 Of course, a minimal amount of cooperation and alignment of 
interests is required to recognize the need (or desire) to manage and 
control conflict rather than let it blow up. But it can of course happen 
that particular political strands in a society in fact seek to let conflict 
blow up as a way to acquire or maintain power.
25 Some examples of pessimistic assessments of the value of argu-
mentation would be Schopenhauer’s satirical account of ‘dialectic’ 
in Eristic Dialectic: The Art of Winning an Argument, and Schmitt’s 
bleak appreciation of parliamentary debates: “The essence of liberal-
ism is negotiation, a cautious half-measure, in the hope that the defin-
itive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a 
parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever 
in an everlasting discussion.” (Schmitt 2005, p. 63).
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at least some forms of conflict and contestation are essen-
tial for the healthy political life of a society: “a democratic 
polity, conflicts and confrontations, far from being a sign of 
imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and inhabited 
by pluralism.” (Mouffe 2000, p. 34).
Among the different agonistic authors (conveniently sur-
veyed in Wenman 2013), Mouffe in particular attributes to 
democratic institutions the crucial role of transforming (or 
‘sublimating’ in the Freudian sense, as she prefers to put 
it) hostility and aggression into constructive forms of con-
flict and contest. To conceptualize these processes, Mouffe 
relies on two related distinctions: ‘the political’, which is 
understood in terms of antagonism, and ‘politics’, which is 
understood in terms of agonism:
I have developed these reflections on ‘the political’, 
understood as the antagonistic dimension which is 
inherent to all human societies. To that effect, I have 
proposed the distinction between ‘the political’ and 
‘politics’. ‘The political’ refers to this dimension of 
antagonism which can take many forms and can emerge 
in diverse social relations. It is a dimension that can 
never be eradicated. ‘Politics’, on the other hand, refers 
to the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions 
that seeks to establish a certain order and to organ-
ize human coexistence in conditions which are always 
potentially conflicting, since they are affected by the 
dimension of ‘the political’. (Mouffe 2013, p. 2/3)
Conflict in liberal democratic societies cannot and 
should not be eradicated, since the specificity of pluralist 
democracy is precisely the recognition and the legitima-
tion of conflict. What liberal democratic politics requires 
is that the others are not seen as enemies to be destroyed, 
but as adversaries whose ideas might be fought, even 
fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not to be 
questioned. To put it in another way, what is important is 
that conflict does not take the form of an ‘antagonism’ 
(struggle between enemies) but the form of an ‘agonism’ 
(struggle between adversaries). (Mouffe 2013, p. 7)
While Mouffe does not discuss argumentation specifically, it 
seems reasonable to read her reference to “the ensemble of 
practices, discourses and institutions” that constitutes liberal 
democracies as including argumentation and deliberation. 
Argumentation should thus play an important role in the 
sublimation of antagonism into agonism. Notice however 
that this is an ongoing process, not an end-point: antagonism 
remains in the background and rears its ugly head time and 
again.26 In fact, Mouffe maintains that denying the perennial 
existence of conflict and antagonism, which she describes 
as “the typical liberal gesture,”27 is particularly dangerous:
Firstly, the predominant democratic praxis is in 
denial about the reality of ‘the political’ and, sec-
ondly, and ironically perhaps, this naive renunciation 
actually exacerbates conflict and makes antagonism 
more likely, because these tendencies open the door 
to extremist parties who claim to offer a meaningful 
alternative to mainstream consensus elites. In other 
words, the emphasis on consensus provokes a ‘return 
of the political’ in the form of a heightened potential 
for antagonism… (Wenman 2013, p. 181)
Indeed, Mouffe credits the rise of extreme-right populism 
in the last 20 years to the excessive focus on consensus 
and disregard for the ever-present underlying antagonistic 
forces in any society. “Antagonistic conflicts are less likely 
to emerge as long as agonistic legitimate political channels 
for dissenting voices exist. Otherwise dissent tends to take 
violent forms.” (Mouffe 2005, p. 21).
Notice that the claim is not that, by itself, argumentation 
will be able to tame and ‘sublimate’ antagonism into ago-
nism. Even at the level of discursive practices, other forms of 
communicative engagement appear to be required to foster 
a truly inclusive public sphere of discourse. The political 
theorist Marion Iris Young (who was not an agonist thinker 
herself) in particular argued that greeting (understood as 
public acknowledgment), rhetoric, and narrative are impor-
tant communicative actions that come to complement argu-
mentation/deliberation so as to ensure inclusiveness (Young 
2000, Chapter 2). But with suitable provisions to counter 
excessive escalation in place (Aikin 2011), argumentation 
may constitute a useful tool to manage conflict and channel 
hostility into constructive forms of conflict: turning enemies 
into adversaries, as Mouffe puts it. We are here reminded of 
how various forms of martial arts (and sport competitions 
more generally) may be seen as attempts to channel aggres-
sion and hostility towards constructive, virtuous adversarial-
ity (see Kidd (2020) on the analogy between martial arts and 
practices of argumentation). However, the goal should not 
be to suppress conflict entirely; this is not only impossible, 
but in fact also perilous in that, paradoxically, suppression 
26 “In Mouffe’s view, every consensus appears as a contingent ‘sta-
bilisation of something essentially unstable and chaotic’, and this 
constitutive instability should not be seen – with Hegel, Habermas, or 
the contemporary theorists of deliberative democracy – as a ‘tempo-
rary obstacle… on the road… towards harmony and reconciliation’.” 
(Wenman 2013, p. 195).
Footnote 26 (continued)
27 “The political in its antagonistic dimension cannot be made to dis-
appear by simply denying it or wishing it away. This is the typical 
liberal gesture, and such negation only leads to the impotence that 
characterizes liberal thought when confronted with the emergence 
of antagonisms and forms of violence that, according to its theory, 
belong to a bygone age when reason had not yet managed to control 
the supposedly archaic passions.” (Mouffe 2013, p. 3/4).
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attempts increase the likelihood of violent manifestations of 
dissent and conflict.
It may be thought that these considerations only apply 
to political aspects of argumentation, having no bearing on 
the epistemic telos discussed above. However, conflict in a 
pluralistic society can also have beneficial epistemic conse-
quences. In this vein, Medina (2011, 2013) transposes the 
value of agonism to the epistemic domain through the con-
cepts of epistemic friction and guerilla pluralism:
The epistemic friction produced by the interaction of 
heterogeneous standpoints can yield a critical aware-
ness of multiple ways of perceiving and can point in 
the direction of change, of the melioration of our per-
ceptual attitudes and habits. (Medina 2013, p. 224)
[Guerilla pluralism] is not a pluralism that tries to 
resolve conflicts and overcome struggles, but instead 
tries to provoke them and to re-energize them. It is a 
pluralism that aims not at the melioration of the cog-
nitive and ethical lives of all, but rather, at the (epis-
temic and socio-political) resistance of some against 
the oppression of others. (Medina 2011, p. 24)
More generally, the point is that argumentation that takes 
the form of resistance and contestation in contexts of social 
injustice and oppression should indeed be adversarial, in 
the sense of containing vigorous critiques of the status quo. 
Attempts to eliminate conflict from argumentation entirely 
may in fact end up favoring the status quo, a conclusion that 
is surprisingly at odds with the feminist critique of adver-
sariality in argumentation. Of course, adversarial argumenta-
tion can also be used as an instrument of oppression, and the 
feminist critique of argumentative adversariality as a form of 
exclusion must be taken seriously. So a rule of thumb might 
be that the more powerful side of an argumentative encoun-
ter should generally speaking be less ‘adversarial’, whereas 
the less powerful side may avail themselves of more forceful 
modes of argumentative intervention: after all, there can be 
no social change without irritating the powerful.
7  Conclusion
In this paper, I formulated a conception of adversariality 
in terms of conflicting interests so as to discuss the role of 
adversariality in argumentation. Overall, the paper presents 
a defense of proportional adversariality: an argumentative 
situation should be adversarial in proportion to the pre-
argumentative levels of adversariality (conflict of interests) 
between the parties involved. In cooperative settings, that 
is, when people share common goals and may join forces 
to achieve them together, adversariality in argumentation 
is unnecessary and often counterproductive. By contrast, if 
there is an antecedent background of conflict of interests, 
then it may well be desirable and appropriate to engage in 
adversarial, forceful argumentation. I take it that conflict as 
such is an inevitable feature of human sociality, and attempts 
to ‘wish conflict away’ often do more harm than good. What 
is required instead are ways to channel and manage conflict; 
with suitable provisions in place to contain harmful escala-
tion, argumentation can be one of the strategies used for 
this purpose.
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Appendix 1: How to Measure Adversariality 
(Joint Work with Hein Duijf)
The notion of proportional adversariality seems to require a 
way to ‘measure’ more or less precisely the degree of adver-
sariality between two parties. So here is a simple formal 
model of how this could be done. The model is obviously an 
idealization far removed from complex real-life situations, 
but it indicates that the notion of proportional adversariality 
need not be hopelessly vague and imprecise.
Consider two agents (or groups), A and B. Each has a set 
of interests pertaining to states of affairs  S1,  S2,  S3,  S4 … 
Interest  IAk represents A’s position with respect to state of 
affairs  Sk, which is one of three options:
• IAk = 1: A wants  Sk to obtain,
• IAk = −1: A wants  Sk not to obtain,
• IAk = 0: A is indifferent with respect to  Sk.
A’s interests generate an ordered set of numerical values 
 IA = (IA1,  IA2,  IA3 …  IAz), and the same applies to B’s inter-
ests:  IB = (IB1,  IB2,  IB3 …  IBz). The degree of interest align-
ment between A and B can be determined by comparing  IA 
and  IB in terms of the distance between each of the paired 
values in the sets. So if  IAk = 1 and  IBk = −1, the distance cor-
responds to 2; if  IAk = 1 and  IBk = 0, the distance corresponds 
to 1; if  IAk = 1 and  IBk = 1, the distance corresponds to 0 etc. 
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Adding up the scores for each comparison pair  IAk and  IBk 
yields a numerical value on a scale from full conflict (2z, 
where z is the index of the last item in each interest set  IA 
and  IB) to full alignment (0).
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